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1522 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, The New York Times published a highly personal op-ed 
written by Nick Loeb,1 a businessman and Tulane University alumnus.2 
Loeb began the op-ed by writing, “Last August, I filed a complaint . . .
using pseudonyms, to protect two frozen embryos3 I created with my
former fiancée.”4 Loeb said he wanted to keep the issue private, “but
recently the story broke to the world.”5 Loeb’s former fiancée is actress 
Sofia Vergara, who starred in the ABC series Modern Family.6 In August
of 2014, Loeb sued Vergara in California seeking possession of two frozen
embryos that he and Vergara created through a second round of in vitro
fertilization (IVF)7 the previous year.8 The couple contracted with a
1. Nick Loeb, Sofia Vergara’s Ex-Fiancé: Our Frozen Embryos Have a
Right to Live, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/
30/opinion/sofiavergaras-ex-fiance-our-frozen-embryos-have-a-right-to-live.html
[https://perma.cc/8XXD-CUN8]. Loeb recently made headlines for his role as a
co-producer, co-writer, and co-director of a pro-life film titled Roe v. Wade the
Movie, filmed in Louisiana in 2018. E.g., Mike Scott, Roe v. Wade Movie to Film 
in Louisiana—But There’s a Twist, TIMES–PICAYUNE (Jun. 11, 2018),
https://www.nola.com/movies/index.ssf/2018/06/roe_v_wade_movie_to_film_in_l 
o.html [https://perma.cc/59GQ-RKWL]; Charles Lussier, As Roe v. Wade Films,
Vastly Different Stories from Nick Loeb and LSU, Tulane About On-Campus
Filming, THE NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE (Jul. 9, 2018), https://www.the
advocate.com/new_orleans/news/education/article_07c2b3a2-83b8-11e8-b8f6-dbd 
8b71064ad.html [https://perma.cc/RTA7-FURV].
2. Nick Loeb, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0005161/ [https://
perma.cc/PKE5-RTQR] (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
3. Unless otherwise stated, all uses of the word “embryo” in this Comment
refer to a pre-implantation embryo.
4. Loeb, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. In vitro fertilization, most commonly referred to as IVF, is a form of
assisted reproduction that involves fertilizing an egg with sperm in a laboratory
dish. In Vitro Fertilization, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/in%20vitro%20fertilization [https://perma.cc/
69FU-NK5B] (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). See infra Part I.
8. Human Embryo #4 HB-A v. Vergara, No. 17-1498, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 136782, at *5–7 (E.D. La. Aug. 25, 2017). Loeb and Vergara went through
an earlier round of IVF in 2013, which also resulted in two viable embryos. Id. at 
*2–3.
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2020] COMMENT 1523
surrogate,9 but on two separate attempts the embryos failed to implant 
successfully into the surrogate’s uterus.10 
Loeb and Vergara ended their relationship before they were able to
find a new surrogate. They publicly announced their breakup in May of
2014, three months before Loeb filed suit against Vergara.11 Loeb sought
a court order that would allow him to use the two embryos without
Vergara’s consent12 but dropped the suit in December of 2016.13 The day 
before Loeb dropped the suit, he modified a Louisiana trust, which he
created five days earlier, to benefit the couple’s two frozen embryos “if 
they are born alive.”14 The day after Loeb dropped the California suit, he 
directed New Orleans resident James Charbonnet to file a similar suit in 
Louisiana.15 Loeb, however, was not a plaintiff in the new suit.16 Instead, 
Charbonnet brought the suit in his capacity as trustee of Loeb’s newly
created trust.17 
9. Louisiana law uses the term “gestational carrier.” LA. REV. STAT. § 
9:2718.1(4) (2020). Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2718.1(4) defines a
gestational carrier as “a woman who agrees to engage in a process by which she 
attempts to carry and give birth to a child born as a result of an in utero transfer
of a human embryo to which she makes no genetic contribution.” LA. REV. STAT.
§ 9:2718.1(4) (2020).
10. Human Embryo, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136782, at *4–7. Loeb recounted 
the experience in his op-ed, stating: “The first embryo we implanted didn’t take.
The second time, the surrogate miscarried, and I felt crushed.” Loeb, supra note 1.
11. Human Embryo, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136782, at *3–7.
12. Id. at *7.
13. Wilborn P. Nobles III, Sofia Vergara Embryo Case Could Have Broader 
Impacts on Reproductive Law, TIMES–PICAYUNE (last updated Jan. 5, 2017),
https://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2017/01/sofia_vergara_lawsuit_gretna_1. 
html [https://perma.cc/DEF7-43DX].
14. Human Embryo, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136782, at *8. This addition is
notable because article 1771 of the Louisiana Civil Code states that “[t]he obligee
of a conditional obligation, pending fulfillment of the condition, may take all
lawful measures to preserve his right.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1771 (2018); but see
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1770 (2018).
15. Kaileen Gaul, Sofia Vergara Says She has Proof that Her Ex-Fiancé 
Should Not Have Custody of Their Embryos or Be Allowed to Have a Surrogate
Carry Them to Term, DAILY MAIL (last updated July 14, 2017), https://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4693724/Sofia-Vergara-proof-ex-denied-cus
tody-embryos.html [https://perma.cc/99GY-5H7M].
16. Human Embryo, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136782.
17. Brandy Zadrozny, Sofia Vergara Embryo Case Could Open Floodgates,
DAILY BEAST (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.thedailybeast.com/sofia-vergara-
embryo-case-could-open-floodgates [https://perma.cc/4PSE-PEWR]. See also
Human Embryo, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136782.
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1524 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Louisiana’s unique laws, which give embryos the right to sue and be
sued,18 allowed Loeb and Vergara’s two frozen embryos to become
plaintiffs in the suit.19 Ultimately, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana granted a motion to dismiss the case for lack
of personal jurisdiction over Vergara.20 Loeb moved to Louisiana in 
December of 2017, and in January of 2018, he filed another suit against
Vergara, in which he alleged that the two embryos were living children
and that the court should grant him full custody of both.21 The two frozen
embryos are also plaintiffs in the 2018 suit against Vergara.22 Because the 
two embryos are frozen in California, where pre-implantation embryos23 
are considered property, it is theoretically possible that a Louisiana court,
where pre-embryos are considered persons, could have jurisdiction over
the embryos.24 Loeb and the embryos’ suit reveals an underlying chasm
within Louisiana’s human embryo statutes.25 The language in Louisiana
Revised Statutes §§ 9:121–133 presents a quagmire of legal fiction and 
creates an erroneous comparison of two entirely different entities.26 
18. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:124 (2018). Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 9:121 and
9:123–24 classify human pre-implantation embryos as “juridical persons” that
have legal capacity and the right to sue and be sued. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:121, 123– 
24 (2018).
19. See Loeb v. Vergara, 326 F. Supp. 3d 295, 299 (E.D. La. 2018).
20. Human Embryo, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136782, at *20.
21. Loeb, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 300.
22. Id.
23. See supra note 3.
24. Loeb, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 300. Following remand by the Federal District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Judge Kevin Conner, a Louisiana
district court judge for the 25th Judicial District Court of Plaquemines Parish,
dismissed Loeb’s case. See Nick Loeb’s Embryo Case Against Sofia Vergara
Dismissed in Louisiana, PAGE SIX (Oct. 22, 2019), https://pagesix.com/
2019/10/22/nick-loebs-louisiana-case-against-sofia-vergara-dismissed/ [https://
perma.cc/M2AX-P5M4]. Prior to the dismissal, Conner denied Loeb’s motion to
compel discovery, which pertained to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Loeb v. Vergara, No. 64-217 (La. Dist. Ct. Sept. 10,
2019). In his denial, Conner reasoned in part that the Louisiana Legislature did
not intend for the UCCJEA to apply to embryos. See generally id. Loeb
subsequently appealed Conner’s October 11 judgment, and as of February 16,
2020, Loeb’s appeal remained pending. For argument’s sake, this Comment
continues to assume that Louisiana jurisdiction over the pre-implantation embryos
is theoretically possible.
25. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:121 (2018); see generally Loeb, 326 F. Supp. 3d 295.
26. See generally LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:121–33.
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2020] COMMENT 1525
The Louisiana Civil Code categorizes all persons as either natural
persons or juridical persons.27 Currently, the Louisiana Legislature 
classifies pre-implantation embryos as juridical persons.28 Classifying a 
pre-implantation embryo as a juridical person, however, is a one-size-fits-
all approach in need of alterations. By defining pre-implantation embryos
as juridical persons, Louisiana’s human embryo statutes erroneously give
pre-implantation embryos the right to sue,29 raise custody issues that
Louisiana’s custody laws do not adequately address,30 and pose a number
of inconsistencies within the Civil Code.31 Louisiana’s human embryo
statutes need revision. The Louisiana Legislature should amend the legal
status of pre-implantation embryos to be a “unique category of being,”
rather than juridical persons or mere property, which is an alternative that
other jurisdictions employ.32 
Part I of this Comment discusses assisted reproductive technology,33 
the three main categories that states use when determining the legal status
of pre-implantation embryos, and current Louisiana law regarding 
embryos.34 Part II explores the problems that result from Louisiana’s
human embryo statutes, specifically focusing on pre-implantation
embryos’ capacity to sue,35 custody laws that are ill-equipped to address
embryo disputes,36 and theoretical inconsistencies that the statutes create 
within the Civil Code.37 Part III compares two potential solutions and
advocates for the adoption of a middle-ground classification. This
Comment concludes with a recommendation that the Louisiana
Legislature change the laws defining human embryos as juridical persons38 
27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 24 (2018). Article 24 of the Civil Code defines a
natural person as a human being and a juridical person “to which the law attributes
personality, such as a corporation or a partnership.” Id.
28. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:123.
29. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:124.
30. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 131–37.
31. See, e.g., LA CIV. CODE arts. 26, 1474.
32. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that the ex-
husband’s interest in not procreating was greater than ex-wife’s interest in
donating frozen pre-implantation embryos to another couple).
33. See generally What Is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/art/whatis.html [https://perma.cc/AE6T-XR7X] (last reviewed
Feb. 7, 2017).
34. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:121–33.
35. Id. at § 9:124.
36. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 131–37.
37. See, e.g., LA CIV. CODE arts. 26, 1474.
38. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:123.
346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd  538 10/12/20  7:08 AM





     
 
   
  
 





       
         
   
 




   
 
     
       
     
 
    
   




    
 
   
    
     
         
 
 
     
      
 
1526 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
to instead articulate human embryos as “a unique category of being.”39 It
is important to note that this Comment does not answer or address the 
question of when life begins. Instead, it focuses on the practical
consequences that result from Louisiana’s human embryo statutory
scheme40 and explores the language used to define the legal status of pre-
implantation embryos.41 
I. REPRODUCTION 2.0: DEFINING ART AND THE IVF PROCESS
The developmental intricacies of Louisiana’s human embryo statutes
require an understanding of the continuing advancements in assisted
reproductive technology (ART).42 ART refers to all fertility treatments that
involve the “in vitro handling” of eggs, sperm, and embryos, specifically
for reproduction purposes.43 IVF is one type of fertility treatment that falls
under the larger umbrella of ART.44 IVF results in the fertilization of a
woman’s ovum outside her uterus, independent of her body.45 In fact, the 
39. This language comes from an article published in the Louisiana Bar
Journal in 1985. The Louisiana Bar Association published the article, written by
John B. Krentel, who, at the time, was a health care administrator finishing his
last semester of law school. In his article, Krentel proposed the legal scheme that
is now Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 9:121–33. See generally John B. Krentel,
“Ownership” of the Fertilized Ovum In Vitro: A Hypothetical Case in Louisiana,
32 LA. B.J. 284 (1985).
40. See generally LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:121–33.
41. The Eastern District Court of Appeals of Missouri clarified this distinction 
in a 2016 case, stating 
[I]t is important to initially note that this Court recognizes the sensitive 
nature of this case and the differing personal beliefs it evokes – ethical,
religious, and philosophical – pertaining to scientific advancements in
reproductive technology, procreational choice, and the age-old disputed
question of when life begins. Those issues are not for this Court to decide
. . . . Instead, we are only required to decide whether frozen pre-embryos
have the legal status of children under our dissolution of marriage
statutes. 
McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 137–38 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
42. See generally What Is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, supra note 33.
43. Fernando Zegers-Hochschild, et al., The International Glossary on
Infertility and Fertility Care, 108 FERTILITY & STERILITY 393, 401 (2017); ART
Success Rates, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html
[https://perma.cc/7C22-NX44] (last updated May 16, 2018).
44. ART Success Rates, supra note 43.
45. See, e.g., Zegers-Hochschild, et al., supra note 43, at 401; In Vitro
Fertilization, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, 
346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd  539 10/12/20  7:08 AM




     
   
      
 
    
  
   
       
   
  
     
  
 
    





      
  
 
   
    
  
   
     
   
        
   
    
   
     
   
     
   
     
        




       
2020] COMMENT 1527
term in vitro literally translates to “in glass,”46 whereas the term in vivo
translates to “in the living.”47 The first successful birth using IVF, which
is now the most commonly used type of ART,48 occurred in Great Britain
in 1978.49 
A. Up Close and Personal with Assisted Reproduction
More than 40 years ago on July 25, 1978, John and Lesley Brown were
delighted by the birth of their daughter, Louise Joy Brown,50 the first baby 
ever born using IVF.51 Now, four decades later, Louise lives in England,
where she enjoys a normal life with her husband and two sons.52 In 1981,
three years after Louise’s birth, the first IVF baby was born in the United
States.53 IVF initially developed using the natural menstrual cycle;
however, ovarian stimulation quickly became the norm.54 In general, a
woman begins the IVF process with medication for ovarian stimulation to
grow multiple eggs at once.55 The number of eggs that are grown and 
retrieved from a stimulation cycle varies, and not all eggs retrieved are
used or viable.56 
https://www.reproductive facts.org/topics/topics-index/in-vitro-fertilization-ivf/
[https://perma.cc/ZUN9-A LE7] (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
46. In Vitro, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-web
ster.com/dictionary/in%20vitro [https://perma.cc/96GQ-RXW3] (last visited Oct.
6, 2018).
47. Id.
48. Assisted Reproductive Technologies, SOCIETY FOR ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, https://www.sart.org/SART_Assisted_Reproduct
ive_Technologies/ [https://perma.cc/P9XU-GWMH] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
49. Craig Niederberger & Antonio Pellicer, Introduction, 110 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 185, 188 (2018); Kevin U. Stephens, Sr., Reproductive Capacity: What 
Does the Embryo Get?, 24 S.U. L. REV. 263, 265 (1997).
50. Ciara Nugent, What It Was Like to Grow Up as the World’s First ‘Test-
Tube Baby,’ TIME (July 25, 2018), http://time.com/5344145/louise-brown-test-
tube-baby/ [https://perma.cc/F2AS-3CJ2].
51. Stephens, supra note 49, at 265. Louise’s younger sister, Natalie, born in
1982, was the 40th baby born using IVF. Nugent, supra note 50.
52. Nugent, supra note 50.
53. Id.
54. Bart C.J.M. Fauser & Basil C. Tarlatzis, Progress in Ovarian Stimulation 
for IVF Over Time, 110 FERTILITY & STERILITY 185, 263 (2018).
55. Zegers-Hochschild, et al., supra note 43, at 403; ART: Step-by-Step
Guide, SOCIETY FOR ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, 
https://www.sart.org /ART_Step-by-Step_Guide/ [https://perma.cc/Z5BJ-H9BC]
(last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
56. See generally Fauser & Tarlatzis, supra note 54, at 263–66.
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1528 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Since 1981, the use of ART has increased, and in the last decade alone,
its use has doubled.57 According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), as of 2016, babies conceived by ART account for
approximately 1.75% of all births in the United States.58 That percentage
is up from 1.5% in 2013,59 and it equates to over 74,000 births.60 By 1984, 
cryopreservation, a process that involves the use of extremely low
temperature to preserve biological material like pre-embryos,61 made it 
possible to freeze excess and unused embryos.62 Estimates place the 
number of embryos currently stored in the United States somewhere
between 700,000 and 1,000,000.63 This number has increased from an
estimate of over 600,000 stored embryos in 2016.64 The increased use of
ART has financial implications as well, with recent market research
placing the value of the global IVF market at $523.57 million in 2017.65 
57. ART Success Rates, supra note 43. IVF is one type of assisted
reproductive technology (ART), whereas ART encompasses all fertility
treatments involving eggs and embryos. Id.
58. Id.
59. Anna Stolley Persky, Deep Freeze: Contentious Battles Between Couples 
over Preserved Embryos Raise Legal and Ethical Dilemmas, 102 A.B.A. J. 46 
(June 2016).
60. More than 74 Thousand Babies Born from Assisted Reproductive
Technology Cycles Done in 2018, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE 




61. Zegers-Hochschild, et al., supra note 43, at 398. Cryopreservation can be
done by either slow-freezing or vitrification. In the slow-freezing process, the 
temperature of a cell, or cells, is gradually lowered from room temperature to
“extreme low temperature.” Vitrification, on the other hand, is an “ultra-rapid”
procedure that prevents ice from forming in a cell. Zegers-Hochschild, et al.,
supra note 43, at 398, 405–06.
62. René Frydman, Toward Single Embryo Transfer, 110 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 185, 204 (2018).
63. Mia De Graff, The Baby that Was Conceived Just 18 Months After Its
Mother: Woman, 26, Gives Birth to Baby Girl from a Donated Embryo that Was 
Frozen for 24 Years—the Longest Ever, DAILY MAIL (last updated Dec. 19, 2017),
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-5195629/Woman-26-delivers-baby-fr 
ozen-embryo-24-YEARS.html [https://perma.cc/HH5Z-2VPE]. 
64. Persky, supra note 59.
65. Global In Vitro Fertilization Market Predicted to Grow USD 920.32
Million by 2024: Zion Market Research, GLOBE NEWSWIRE (Sept. 4, 2014),
https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/09/04/1565032/0/en/Global-In-Vi
tro-Fertilization-Market-Predicted-to-Grow-USD-920-32-Million-by-2024-Zion
346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd  541 10/12/20  7:08 AM











   
     
  
  
    
 
 
   
   
    
    




   
    
    
     
 
    
     
   
    
      
         









     
2020] COMMENT 1529
Moreover, commentators often note the importance of understanding
IVF within the societal context of its development.66 According to the 
CDC, approximately 6.7% of married women in the United States, aged
15 to 44, are infertile.67 In addition, around 7.3 million women of the same
age group in the United States have used some type of infertility service.68 
Commensurate with the expanded use of ART is the diversification of
individual goals and family planning needs.69 Although the original idea
of IVF was to enable married, heterosexual individuals suffering from
infertility to have biological children of their own, its use has expanded
significantly in the last 40 years.70 As one commentator notes, “The
success of in vitro fertilization . . . has made it possible to create families
in ways not previously imagined.”71 Today, the use of IVF extends beyond
heterosexual couples72 and makes assisted reproduction possible for same-
-Market-Research.html [https://perma.cc/P8BS-HK63]. In addition, the global IVF
market is expected to generate around $920.32 million in revenue by 2024. Id.
66. Heather E. Ross & Guido Pennings, Legal and Ethical Aspects of In Vitro
Fertilization, 110 FERTILITY & STERILITY 185, 300 (2018).
67. Infertility, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, https:// 
www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/infertility.htm [https://perma.cc/75YA-PFHL] (last
updated July 15, 2016). Infertility is defined as a disease that prevents an
individual from “clinical pregnancy after 12 months of regular, unprotected sexual
intercourse” or because of “an impairment of a person’s capacity to reproduce.”
Zegers-Hochschild, et al., supra note 43, at 406.
68. Infertility, supra note 67.
69. See, e.g., Ross & Pennings, supra note 66, at 299–301; Susan C. Klock,
In Vitro Fertilization and the Psychology of Reproduction: Opportunity and
Hope, 110 FERTILITY & STERILITY 185, 301–03 (2018).
70. Ross & Pennings, supra note 66, at 300. “In many circumstances, aspiring
parents have encountered barriers—both natural and regulatory—preventing
them from having children.” Taylor E. Brett, Comment, The Modern Day Stork:
Validating the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts in Louisiana, 
60 LOY. L. REV. 587, 592 (2014).
71. Ross & Pennings, supra note 66, at 299; see, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha,
Fertility Frontier: 44 Siblings and Counting, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/health/44-donor-siblings-and-
counting/?utm_term=.68e65a2871a8 [https://perma.cc/9SEY-3PSJ] (noting that a
lack of regulation has resulted in huge genetic families who are seeking each other
out).
72. As Bruce Wilder, former Chair of the ABA Section of Family Law’s
Committee on the Law of Genetic and Reproduction Technology, notes, ART
“has been made available to people who are physically unable to engage in coitus
. . . . people for whom gestation and childbirth pose unacceptable risks . . . . [and]
people who wish to avoid the risks of having children with genetically determined
diseases.” Bruce Lord Wilder, Current Status of Assisted Reproduction
346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd  542 10/12/20  7:08 AM











   
  
  
   
   
  
 
     
 
       
    
   
  
    







   
   
  
       
      
  
    
 
     
       
    
   
  
1530 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
sex couples, older women, single women, and, through surrogacy, single
men.73 In addition to its increased accessibility to the average person,
modern technological advancements have changed the way individuals 
use ART.74 Cryopreservation, for example, allows individuals to freeze 
excess, unused pre-embryos, giving women additional attempts at
successful implantation without having to go through the egg stimulation
and removal process each time.75 Although some patients might freeze 
eight embryos in the hopes of having one or two children,76 others may
have difficulty creating even one viable embryo.77 
B. It Takes a Village: Regulating Assisted Reproductive Technology
According to the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM), ART is one of the most highly regulated medical practices in the 
nation78 that is subject to federal regulation, like the Fertility Clinic
Success Rate and Certification Act,79 as well as state regulation through 
Technology 2005: An Overview and Glance at the Future, 39 FAM. L. Q. 573,
573–74 (2005).
73. Ross & Pennings, supra note 66, at 300.
74. Id. at 300–01.
75. Henry D. Gabriel & Eunice B. Davis, Symposium, An Interdisciplinary 
Examination of New Reproductive Technology: Legal Ethics in Reproductive
Technology, 45 LOY. L. REV. 221, 229 (1999).
76. See, e.g., The Mom Who Did IVF—For Her Husband’s Infertility, CUT
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/09/the-mom-who-did-ivf-for-her-
husbands-infertility-not-hers.html [https://perma.cc/X4AH-EURJ] (discussing one
couple’s experience with IVF, which included retrieval of 36 eggs from the wife
after her first egg-stimulation cycle). The couple tried to fertilize 30 eggs with the
husband’s sperm and six with donor sperm. The husband’s sperm successfully
fertilized only one of the 30 eggs. Eventually, the couple was able to conceive using 
one of the six eggs fertilized by the donor’s sperm and had a son. The couple then
went through the IVF process again for the birth of their daughter. From that egg-
stimulation cycle, 40 eggs were retrieved. Id.
77. See generally Fauser & Tarlatzis, supra note 54, at 263–66.
78. Practice Committee Documents, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE
MEDICINE, https://www.asrm.org/news-and-publications/practice-committee-doc
uments/?filterbycategoryid=323 [https://perma.cc/W27T-A7VP] (last visited Sept.
18, 2018).
79. Saswati Sunderam et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance
– United States, 2015, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT SURVEILLANCE 
SUMMARIES (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/ss/ss6703
a1.htm?s_cid=ss6703a1_w [https://perma.cc/KJC5-5PE7]. Congress enacted the
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act (FCSRCA) in 1992. The
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2020] COMMENT 1531
state medical boards that control physician licensing.80 Not all share 
ASRM’s view that ART is one of the most highly regulated areas of
medical practice, however.81As one commentator notes, “there are valid
concerns that ART is not sufficiently regulated in the United States,
especially when compared with ART regulatory schemes in other
developed nations.”82 Individuals with this view often point to the state-
by-state nature of ART regulation in the U.S.83 In addition to official
government regulatory schemes, ART professional societies play a vital
role in the oversight of assisted reproduction.84 The ASRM, for example,
issues various guidelines on topics surrounding ART.85 ASRM also has an 
ethics committee that publishes opinions on difficult and controversial
situations raised by the use of ART.86 
FCSRCA requires the CDC to collect data about the nation’s fertility clinics, as well
as all ART procedures performed in those clinics. Id.
80. See generally Practice Committee Documents, supra note 78.
81. See, e.g., Ima E. Nsien, Navigating the Federal Regulatory Structure of




83. See generally id. 
84. Practice Committee Documents, supra note 78.
85. See id.
86. See Ethics Committee Opinions, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE
MEDICINE, https://www.asrm.org/news-and-publications/ethics-committee-docu
ments/ [https://perma.cc/3ML6-F64Y] (last visited Sept. 18, 2018). For example,
in 2013, the ASRM ethics committee issued an opinion on the disposition of
abandoned embryos. The opinion, in part, states that it is “ethically acceptable”
for ART programs and fertility clinics to consider frozen embryos abandoned
when at least five years have passed “since contact with an individual or couple,
diligent efforts have been made to contact the individual or couple, and no written
instructions from the couple exist concerning disposition.” The opinion further
states that no one should ever use abandoned embryos in research or donate them
to another individual or couple. Disposition of Abandoned Embryos: A Committee
Opinion, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, 99 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 1848 (2013), https://www.asrm.org/globalassets/asrm/ asrm-
content/news-and-publications/ethics-committee-opinions/disposition_of_ 
abandoned_embryos-pdfmembers.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7GX-3M7Q].
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1532 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
C. Ice, Ice Baby: Exploring the Legal Status of the Pre-Implantation 
Embryo
States autonomously determine the legal status afforded to pre-
implantation embryos.87 The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
grants police power to the states,88 so the regulation of health and safety
issues like the practice of medicine and medical board licensing fall
“squarely within” authority traditionally reserved to the states.89 The legal
status of pre-implantation embryos often determines which approach a
state will take when settling disputes involving embryos.90 As one
commentator writes, “Courts and counsel embroiled in this emerging area
of law must deal with delicate issues of whether these types of cases
encompass mere property and contractual rights, the rights of potential
human beings, or a sensitive and certainly highly subjective middle ground
category balancing the rights of the progenitors.”91 In the case of Davis v.
Davis, for example, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that within the
scientific testimony, there was a significant amount of discussion
dedicated solely to using the “proper descriptive terminology” to refer to
pre-implantation embryos in the case.92 The Tennessee Supreme Court
stated that although the scientific testimony seemed to be a simple matter
of semantics, “semantical distinctions are significant in this context
because language defines legal status and can limit legal rights.”93 Given
the state-by-state assignment of legal status to pre-implantation embryos,
a human embryo in one state may be treated as a person, while in a
different state the embryo may be treated as property.94 States that have
addressed the legal status of pre-implantation embryos, either legislatively 
or judicially, primarily fall into three categories: (1) states that label pre-
87. See generally Nsien, supra note 81. Nsien notes that “[t]he state take[s] a
piecemeal approach to regulating certain aspects of ART; for example, some
states have enacted statutes—albeit far from uniform—related to insurance
coverage of infertility treatments.” Id.
88. The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is titled “Powers reserved
to states or people” and states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
89. Nsien, supra note 81.
90. See generally Elizabeth A. Trainor, Right of Husband, Wife, or Other 
Party to Custody of Frozen Embryo, Pre-Embryo, or Pre-Zygote in Event of 
Divorce, Death, or Other Circumstances, 87 A.L.R.5TH 253, at *2a (2018).
91. Id.
92. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tenn. 1992).
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. See Persky, supra note 59.
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embryos as property; (2) states that consider pre-embryos persons; and
(3) states that fall somewhere in the middle.95 Most states, however, have
refrained from addressing whether pre-implantation embryos should be
considered persons, property, or a category in between.96 
1. Pre-Embryos as Property
Several states, including Missouri, Washington, Oregon, and
California, classify embryos as property.97 California, for example, allows 
individuals going through fertility treatments to decide for themselves
what they will do with any excess or unused embryos.98 The California
Legislature approaches embryo disposition from a contract law
perspective and has enacted legislation requiring parties to provide written
directives prior to treatment.99 California added the written directives
requirement to its Health and Safety Code in 2002 to make clear that health
care providers are responsible for informing their patients of the options
available for any unused embryos after treatment.100 Options available to 
IVF patients in California include discarding the embryos, continuing to 
store the embryos, donation to another individual, or donation for
scientific research.101 
95. See generally id.
96. Maura Dolan, Embryo Battles Are Likely to Get a Precedent in San
Francisco Couple’s Case, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/
local/california/la-me-embryo-20150920-story.html [https://perma.cc/3S82-M9SP].
97. See, e.g., McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 137–38 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2016) (affirming a trial court decision that classified a divorced couple’s two
frozen pre-embryos as marital property of a special character); In re Marriage of
Guardado, 2018 Wash. App. LEXIS 292 (Wash. App. 2018) (holding that the trial
court did not err when it awarded parties joint ownership of their embryo); Dahl
v. Angle, 194 P.3d 834 (Or. App. 2008) (upholding a trial court’s decision that
the embryos in question, as personal property subject to a contractual agreement,
be destroyed).
98. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 (2018).
99. Id. Prior to the IVF process, Loeb and Vergara signed a written directive.
Human Embryo #4 HB-A v. Vergara, No. 17-1498, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
136782, at *4–5 (E.D. La. Aug. 25, 2017).
100. 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 789 § 125115 (West).
101. The specific language added to California’s Health and Safety Code in
2002 states that:
(a) A physician, surgeon, or other health care provider delivering fertility
treatment shall provide his or her patient with timely, relevant, and
appropriate information to allow the individual to make an informed and
346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd  546 10/12/20  7:08 AM




    
   
  
   
  
    
  
   
  
 
   
 








    
      
     













    
     
 




    
1534 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
New York also classifies embryos as property. The 2018 case
Finkelstein v. Finkelstein,102 a New York appellate court decision, “falls
in line with the majority of appellate embryo disposition cases around the
country where the parties’ unequivocal, written consent or agreement as
to future disposition is respected.”103 Nevertheless, the New York 
Legislature has attempted, unsuccessfully, to pass legislation regulating
the disposition of cryopreserved embryos for several years.104 The 
legislature’s most recent attempt was in 2017.105 Similar to California’s 
law, the bill would have required individuals who use ART to provide
written consent and directives regarding the disposition of embryos and
gametes before the start of any procedure.106 
voluntary choice regarding the disposition of any human embryos
remaining following the fertility treatment. 
(b) Any individual to whom information is provided pursuant to
subdivision (a) shall be presented with the option of storing any unused
embryos, donating them to another individual, discarding the embryos,
or donating the remaining embryos for research.
(c) Any individual who elects to donate embryos remaining after fertility
treatments for research shall provide written consent. 
2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 789 § 125116(a)–(c) (West). 
102. Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, 79 N.Y.S.3d 17 (1st Dep’t 2018).
103. Susan Crockin, New York Appellate Court Upholds Couple’s Embryo
Disposition Choice Permitting Withdrawal of Consent, ASRM: LEGALLY
SPEAKING (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.asrm.org/news-and-publications/news-
and-research/legally-speaking/embryo-disputes-in-both-u.s.-and-canada/ [https://
perma.cc/A4JE-FX4K].
104. The New York Legislature introduced legislation in 2001, 2003, 2005,
2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017. A.B. 7026, 225th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2001); A.B. 1908, 226th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003); A.B.
1113, 228th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); A.B. 2531, 230th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007); A.B. 2761, 232nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2009); A.B. 3218, 234th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011); S.B. 1474,
236th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); S.B. 2708, 238th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015); and S.B. 5835, 240th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
2017).
105. S.B. 5835, 240th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
106. The actual language in the legislative history states: 
Enormous strides have recently been made in the field of reproductive
medicine which have assisted thousands of couples. However, there are
several areas of this emerging science where legal and ethical questions
proliferate. Currently there are few regulations regarding the use and 
disposition of cryopreserved embryos and gametes. This bill would
directly deal with some of those concerns by requiring parties
undergoing an in vitro procedure to provide both consent and advanced
346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd  547 10/12/20  7:08 AM






   
     
   
     
   
        
  
    
 
  
    
  
 




   
   
 
 




   
 
       
     
   
 
     
       
        
     
     
     
   
  
2020] COMMENT 1535
2. Pre-Embryos as Persons
Arizona is the most recent state to pass “personhood legislation.”107 
Generally, “personhood legislation” refers to legislation that seeks to
define life as “beginning at the moment an egg is fertilized.”108 In April of
2018, the Arizona Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1393, which regulates
the disposition of IVF human embryos.109 The new law requires courts,
upon the dissolution of a marriage, to give any pre-implantation embryos
to the party who intends to develop the embryos to birth.110 If both spouses 
intend to develop the embryos to birth, the court must award the embryos
to the party who provided its gametes.111 In a situation where both parties 
intend to develop the embryo to birth and both provided their gametes,
courts must “resolve any dispute on disposition of the in vitro human
embryos in a manner that provides the best chance for the in vitro human
embryos to develop to birth.”112 A number of other states, including 
Mississippi, Georgia, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia, have
attempted to pass personhood legislation but have not succeeded.113 
3. The Middle Ground
States that fall into the middle category do not grant pre-implantation
embryos the same legal status as persons because of their potential for
human life; however, middle category states also differentiate pre-
implantation embryos from mere property.114 As an example of a “middle 
written directives for the transfer, use and disposition of cryopreserved
embryos or gametes prior to the procedure(s) being performed. One
crucial concern that this bill deals with is the procedures governing the
use, storage and transfer of gametes and embryos, and establishing a
protocol to be followed in the event of a number of events including
divorce, separation, death, or failure to pay storage fees.
S.B. 5835, Legis. Bill Hist. (N.Y. 2017).
107. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-318.03(A)(1) (2018); Policies and
Positions, RESOLVE: NATIONAL INFERTILITY ASSOCIATION (last updated Apr.
2012), https://resolve.org/about-us/policies-and-positions/ [https://perma.cc
/282P-Y39E].
108. Policies and Positions, supra note 107.
109. S.B. 1393, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2018).
110. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-318.03(A)(1).
111. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-318.03(A)(3).
112. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-318.03(A)(2).
113. Policies and Positions, supra note 107.
114. The argument for an interim category, from an ethical or moral
standpoint, is that a pre-implantation embryo “deserves respect greater than that
346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd  548 10/12/20  7:08 AM






   
 
   
   
 
    
    
   
  
   
   
 
     
     
  






     
 
    
 
    
      
       
 
    
       
  
  
   
    
   
   
   
         
1536 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
ground” state, Tennessee classifies pre-implantation embryos not as
persons or property, but as “an interim category that entitles them to
special respect because of their potential for human life.”115 Tennessee was
one of the earliest states to address embryo disposition.116 In 1992, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court decided Davis v. Davis, a case of first
impression117 involving IVF. It held that an ex-husband’s interest in not
procreating was greater than his ex-wife’s interest in donating frozen pre-
embryos to another couple.118 In its holding, the court in Davis stated that
courts should first consider the “preferences of the progenitors” in embryo
disposition cases.119 In cases where the preferences of the progenitors are
unknown or disputed, the court held that the “prior agreement concerning
disposition should be carried out.”120 If a prior agreement does not exist,
courts should balance the interests of the parties involved.121 The Davis
court also stated that a party’s desire to avoid parenthood should outweigh
the other party’s interest in procreating, as long as the other party had a
“reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood” without the use of the
pre-embryos in dispute.122 
D. Legal Status of Embryos in Louisiana
In 1986, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Revised Statutes § 9:123,
often referred to as the human embryo statute.123 The statute gives legal
capacity to pre-implantation embryos, specifically stating: “An in vitro 
accorded human tissue, but not the respect accorded persons.” John A. Robertson,
Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New 
Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 942, 972 (1986). Under this intermediate 
category, commentators argue that “greater respect is due embryos than is
accorded other human tissue because of their potential to become persons, and
because of the symbolic meaning embryos may elicit.” Id.
115. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
116. See id.
117. A case of first impression “presents the court with an issue of law that has
not previously been decided by any controlling legal authority in that jurisdiction.”
Case of First Impression, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2016).
118. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. Davis v. Davis involved a husband and wife
who tried IVF but were ultimately unsuccessful. Id. at 589. After the couple
divorced, the ex-husband wanted to avoid parenthood, but the ex-wife wanted to
donate the pre-embryos to another couple for implantation. Id. at 603–04.




123. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:123 (2018); see generally Krentel, supra note 39.
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2020] COMMENT 1537
fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person until such time as the in
vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the womb; or at any other time when
rights attach to an unborn child in accordance with the law.”124 The human
embryo statute originated from an article that the Louisiana Bar
Association published in 1985,125 which John B. Krentel, a health care 
administrator, wrote while finishing his last semester of law school.126 The
statutory scheme begins by defining the term “human embryo” as an in
vitro fertilized egg that will, emphatically, develop in utero into an unborn 
child.127 The statutory scheme also states that viable pre-embryos shall not
be destroyed128 and that all disputes involving pre-embryos must be
resolved in the best interest of the embryo.129 
In his article, Krentel seeks to distinguish in vitro embryos from in 
vivo embryos, stating that “the fertilized ovum in utero is actually akin to
the property of the pregnant woman.”130 Because a woman’s body does
not yet contain pre-implantation embryos, Krentel argues that the law 
should not consider in vitro embryos as the woman’s property.131 By
defining pre-embryos as juridical persons, Krentel’s statutory language
was intended to represent “a middle ground acknowledging the humanity
of the embryo, but stopping short of granting it the full personhood of a
‘natural’ person.”132 Krentel proposed the legal scheme based “on the 
constitutional principle that a state has the sovereign power to create
juridical identities.”133 The fact that a state has the power to create juridical
identities, however, does not mean that classifying pre-implantation
embryos as juridical persons is an appropriate use of that power. Even if
Krentel’s human embryo statute and the surrounding legal framework was
ever a workable solution, it does not work today. 
124. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:123.
125. See generally Krentel, supra note 39; see also June Carbone & Naomi 
Cahn, Symposium, Families, Fundamentalism & the First Amendment: Embryo
Fundamentalism, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1015, 1038 (2010).
126. Krentel, supra note 39.
127. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:121.
128. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:129.
129. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:131.
130. Krentel, supra note 39, at 285.
131. Krentel, supra note 39, at 285.
132. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 125, at 1039.
133. Krentel, supra note 39, at 287.
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1538 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
II. OUT WITH THE OLD: STATIC THINKING AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE
Over 30 years have passed since Krentel proposed the statutory
language defining pre-implantation embryos as juridical persons.134 The
Louisiana Legislature enacted the human embryo statute in 1986 when
IVF and the ability to freeze embryos were still in their infant stages.135 In
a footnote, Krentel noted that a woman who “refused” implantation could
either freeze the embryo or have it “immediately implanted in a willing
surrogate mother.”136 Krentel followed up on his suggestion, noting that
freezing the embryo “cannot be done at present in Louisiana due to a lack
of appropriate facilities” and that “[t]he second option of a surrogate
generates a host of legal, medical, and psychological issues that are
complex and far-reaching.”137 Through this statement, Krentel suggested
to his readers that, even though he initially proposed it, his legal scheme
for the human embryo was not practical.138 
Now, after three decades of advancements in medical technology, 
Krentel’s statutory scheme is even less practical due to the numerous
limitations that Louisiana’s laws place on assisted reproductive
technologies like IVF and surrogacy.139 These limitations significantly
narrow the options for people who need reproductive assistance.140 In his
article, Krentel stated that, ethically speaking, “the human embryo is a
unique category of being and ought to be treated as such.”141 Treating
human embryos as juridical persons, however, does not honor this
sentiment. Instead, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:121 forces pre-
134. See generally Krentel, supra note 39.
135. See Jacques Cohen, How the Embryology Laboratory has Changed!, 110
FERTILITY & STERILITY 189, 191 (2018).
136. Krentel, supra note 39, at 288 n.26.
137. Id.
138. See generally Krentel, supra note 39, at 288 n.26.
139. As one commentator notes, “Under the current state of the law in
Louisiana, IVF patients who no longer wish to procreate using their cryopreserved
embryos are prohibited from discarding them, but theoretically could legally
implant the pre-embryos and then abort the more fully developed fetuses.” Sarah
A. Weber, Comment, Dismantling the Dictated Moral Code: Modifying
Louisiana’s In Vitro Fertilization Statutes to Protect Patients’ Procreative
Liberty, 51 LOY. L. REV. 549, 550 (2005).
140. Louisiana laws governing surrogacy, for example, state that intended
parents who engage a gestational surrogate must be married to each other and may
only use their own genetic material to create a child. See LA. REV. STAT. § 
9:2718.1(6) (2020).
141. Krentel, supra note 39, at 287.
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2020] COMMENT 1539
implantation embryos into a legal framework in which they do not fit.142 
The attempt to force embryos into inappropriate and ill-equipped laws is
one of the most problematic aspects of Louisiana’s human embryo statute, 
as seen through an examination of the embryo’s capacity to sue,143 
Louisiana’s child custody laws,144 and theoretical inconsistencies created
within the Civil Code. 
A. Granting Embryos the Capacity to Sue: Louisiana Revised Statutes
Section 9:124
Granting pre-implantation embryos the capacity to sue and be sued
raises significant constitutional concerns.145 The required judicial standard
to resolve disputes “in the best interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum”
gives frozen embryos priority over any party, including gamete donors and
intended parents.146 Although Louisiana, as a state, may have a compelling
interest in an embryo’s potential for human life, this interest is not
absolute. As the United States Supreme Court reiterated in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, decided in 1992, all
prior case law has “respected the private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter.”147 The Casey Court also noted that the right to “define
142. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:121; LA. CIV. CODE art. 26 (2018).
143. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:124.
144. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 131–37.
145. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
146. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:131.
147. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992) (quoting Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). The quote from
Casey, in full, states:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education. Our cases recognize “the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion in
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.” Our precedents “have respected the private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter.” These matters, involving the
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty
is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters 
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.
Id. at 851 (internal citations omitted).
346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd  552 10/12/20  7:08 AM












     
   
  
    




   
    
     
     
 
    
    
 
    
       
      
   
 
   
 
      
   
 
 
   
   
        
       
      
     
  
 
   
1540 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
one’s own concept of existence” lies at the heart of liberty interests 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.148 Given the constitutionally
protected liberty interests of individuals who use ART, the Louisiana
Legislature should not cast aside the rights of current natural persons in
favor of potential natural persons.149 
Another major problem that arises from granting pre-implantation
embryos the capacity to sue or be sued is the resulting expansion of
juridical personhood. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:124 gives pre-
implantation embryos, as juridical persons, the right to sue and be sued.150 
Louisiana Civil Code article 24 defines a juridical person as “an entity to
which the law attributes personality, such as a corporation or a
partnership.”151 As juridical persons, pre-implantation embryos are given
the same legal status as business entities like Costco and Wal-Mart.152 
Given the substantial benefits of limited liability, granting capacity to sue
or be sued is easily understood within the context of a business entity;
however, the same cannot be said about the pre-implantation embryo.153 
In reality, embryos themselves do not have the ability to sue. Instead, the
capacity to sue is in the hands of the individual who owns or possesses the
embryos, and that person can pursue her personal agenda because of the
legal fiction that Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:124 creates.154 
Civil Code article 24 also notes that a juridical person’s personality is
“distinct from that of its members.”155 This language clarifies that, as an
entity, a juridical person’s patrimony156 is “distinct and distinguishable”
148. Id.
149. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:131.
150. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:124. Specifically, the statutes states, “As a juridical
person, the in vitro fertilized human ovum shall be given an identification by the
medical facility for use within the medical facility which entitles such ovum to
sue or be sued. The confidentiality of the in vitro fertilization patient shall be
maintained.” Id.
151. LA. CIV. CODE art. 24.
152. A partnership, for example, is defined in the Civil Code as “a juridical
person, distinct from its partners, created by a contract between two or more
persons to combine their efforts or resources in determined proportions and to
collaborate at mutual risk for their common profit or commercial benefit.” LA.
CIV. CODE art. 2801.
153. See LA REV. STAT. § 12:1-622(B).
154. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:124.
155. LA. CIV. CODE art. 24.
156. “Patrimony” refers to rights and obligations that a person holds to which
monetary value can be attached without offending society. According to civil law
scholar A.N. Yiannopolous, “the word things is often used in a technical sense to
designate the objects of patrimonial rights. Patrimonial rights may attach only to
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2020] COMMENT 1541
from the patrimony of the juridical person’s individual members.157 
Separate patrimonies make sense in the context of a business entity, but
not for pre-implantation embryos. For example, an entity like Wal-Mart
may have its own assets that belong to the business entity as a whole,
whereas the CEO, as an individual, may have personal assets that are
entirely separate. Even in situations in which a business consists of one
person, if limited liability is involved, having different patrimonies makes
sense.158 A pre-implantation embryo, however, does not have one 
patrimony in its capacity as a juridical person and a separate patrimony in
its capacity as an individual member of itself as a juridical person.  
Use of the term juridical—or fictitious—persons traditionally referred
to the concept of collective ownership.159 Collective ownership differs
from undivided co-ownership in several respects.160 According to civilian 
scholar Marcel Planiol, collective ownership is a “special status of
property” that “rests upon the grouping together of the persons to which it
belongs.”161 In contrast, undivided co-ownership allows “physical
merging” of autonomous shares held by individual owners.162 Individual,
autonomous shares do not exist in collective ownership; rather, the thing 
that is collectively owned is subject to common usage or “a complete
dedication of it to the general service.”163 Thus, in its original form,
juridical personhood was meant to distinguish between two different types 
of ownership—not two different kinds of persons.164 As Planiol noted in 
his civil law treatise, juridical personhood, or the concept of fictitious
personality, which historically developed as “something simple and
indisputable,” has long been pushed to its extreme.165 
Jurisdictional problems may also arise from the embryo’s capacity to
sue and be sued. Civil Code article 38 defines the domicile of natural
persons—“the place of his habitual residence”—differently than the
domicile of a juridical person, which is “either that state of its formation
certain material objects and certain intangibles. In this sense, things are material
objects or intangibles that are susceptible of appropriation.” 2 A.N.
YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 28 (5th ed. 2015).
157. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 24 cmt. d.
158. See REV. STAT. § 12:1-622.
159. See generally 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW 775–806
(La. State L. Inst. trans., 1959) (12th ed. 1939).
160. See generally id. at 775–77.
161. Id. at 775.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 776–77.
165. Id. at 778.
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1542 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
or the state of its principal place of business.”166 The domicile of children, 
or “unemancipated minors,” however, is that of “the parent or parents with
whom the minor usually resides.”167 In the Vergara case, for example, the 
two pre-embryos at issue were “formed” at a fertility clinic in
California.168 The frozen embryos remain stored at the California fertility 
clinic,169 which could technically be considered the pre-embryos’ habitual
residence,170 but the pre-embryos have never resided with either Loeb,
domiciled in Florida, or Vergara, domiciled in California.171 Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:126, regarding ownership of pre-embryos, seems to
place some restrictions on jurisdiction, allowing a “court in the parish
where [an] in vitro fertilized ovum is located” to appoint a curator for a
pre-embryo’s protection.172 Given the varied statutes and competing
considerations, it is unclear whether a Louisiana court could exercise 
jurisdiction over an embryo not stored in the state; however, the Loeb v.
Vergara case did acknowledge the possibility.173 
B. Pre-Embryos and Custody: Analyzing the Best Interest Standard
The jurisdictional problems that may arise under a pre-embryo’s
capacity to sue could also impact initial determinations of child custody.174 
Loeb v. Vergara provides an excellent example of jurisdictional problems
that may arise when applying child custody rules to pre-implantation
embryos.175 Because Loeb and Vergara’s two embryos are frozen in
California, a state that considers them property, the embryos have no home
state as children. Consequently, it is theoretically possible that a Louisiana
court could assert jurisdiction over the embryos for an initial custody
determination because, as property located in California, the embryos have
no home state as children.176 Without a definitive home state, however, the
166. LA. CIV. CODE art. 38 (2018).
167. Id. art. 41.
168. Human Embryo #4 HB-A v. Vergara, No. 17-1498, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 136782, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 25, 2017). 
169. Human Embryo, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136782, at *5.
170. LA. CIV. CODE art. 38.
171. Human Embryo, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136782, at *2–3.
172. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:126 (2018).
173. See generally Loeb v. Vergara, 326 F. Supp. 3d 295, 300–02 (E.D. La.
2018); but see supra note 24.
174. See generally Loeb, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 300–02.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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2020] COMMENT 1543
appropriate jurisdiction for an initial custody determination under the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act is uncertain.177 
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:131 requires all disputes involving pre-
embryos to be resolved in the best interest of the embryo, but the statute
does not provide any guidance regarding how embryos’ best interests are
decided.178 The Louisiana Civil Code, on the other hand, includes seven
articles addressing child custody, which are persuasive authority in the
absence of more specific legislation.179 Notably, the Louisiana Legislature
adopted these articles in 1993,180 seven years after the legislature enacted
the statutory scheme for human embryos.181 Similar to Louisiana Revised 
Statutes § 9:131, which requires that any dispute regarding a pre-
implantation embryo be resolved in the best interest of the embryo,182 Civil
Code article 131 mandates that child custody awards be made in 
accordance with the “best interest of the child.”183 Additionally, Civil
Code article 134 provides 14 factors for courts to consider when
determining a child’s best interest in custody cases.184 Some of the factors
include: (1) love and other emotional ties between each party and the child;
(2) how long the child has lived in a particular environment; (3) the 
permanence of the child’s existing or proposed custodial home; (4) the
moral fitness, as well as the mental and physical health of each party; 
(5) the home, school, and community history of the child; and (6) the 
reasonable preference of the child, if of “sufficient age” to express her
preference.185 The factors listed in article 134 are illustrative rather than
exclusive, and the ultimate weight given to each factor is “left to the 
177. There are three contexts that could potentially allow a Louisiana court to
assert initial child custody jurisdiction over the two embryos, including situations
where: (1) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction or a court in the 
child’s home state declined to exercise jurisdiction, the child and at least one
parent have a significant connection to Louisiana other than mere physical
presence, and substantial evidence concerning the child’s well-being is in
Louisiana; (2) other courts with jurisdiction have declined to exercise jurisdiction
because Louisiana is the more appropriate forum; or (3) no court of any other state
would have jurisdiction under the specified criteria. See id.
178. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:131 (2018).
179. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 131–37 (2018).
180. See generally id. The legislature adopted the code articles on child
custody in 1993, but they did not take effect until 1994.
181. See generally LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:121–133.
182. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:131.
183. LA. CIV. CODE art. 131.
184. Id. art. 134.
185. Id.
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1544 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
discretion of the trial court.”186 These factors largely become irrelevant
when applied to pre-implantation embryos. For example, frozen embryos
do not have a home, school, or community history.187 Pre-implantation 
embryos have not developed emotional ties to their intended parents,188 
nor are they able to express any type of preference.189 The factors
considered in child custody determinations are heavily rooted in 
maintaining the status quo and focus on providing the child with a sense
of stability. In the case of pre-embryos, however, there is no status quo to
maintain. 
As individuals who use IVF to conceive are limited in their options
depending on the legal status granted to embryos in their state, any new
solution enacted by the Louisiana Legislature should, at a minimum, allow
individuals who have created embryos using their own genetic material to 
determine whether to implant the embryos, keep the embryos frozen in 
storage, donate the embryos for research or to someone else for
implantation, or discard the embryos. The effort to move toward single
embryo transfer intensifies the significance of pre-embryos’ questioned
custody.190 As commentators note, the creation of excess embryos is 
pragmatic and “an inevitable part of IVF.”191 Krentel’s legal framework
embodies a medical protocol that requires all fertilized eggs to be
implanted in the mother’s womb.192 In reality, however, the number of
embryos implanted in the uterus at one time is subject to specific 
guidelines.193 Medical technology has advanced significantly in the 40 
years since the birth of the first IVF baby.194 Initially, IVF had much lower
pregnancy rates.195 As a result, doctors transferred multiple embryos at
once, attempting to increase the odds that at least one of the transferred
embryos would implant and result in a live birth.196 Today, ART
pregnancy rates have increased, and this increase, combined with the fact
that multiple gestation presents greater risks for mothers and children, has 
186. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 134 cmt. b.
187. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 134(A)(10).
188. See id. art. 134(A)(2).
189. See id. art. 134(A)(11).
190. See generally Frydman, supra note 62, at 204–05.
191. Ross & Pennings, supra note 66, at 300.
192. Krentel, supra note 39, at 287.
193. Sarah E. Richards, The Problem with America’s Twin Epidemic, TIME
(Apr. 16, 2014), http://time.com/52142/the-problem-with-americas-twin-epidem
ic/ [https://perma.cc/VC43-PGLT].
194. Cohen, supra note 135, at 189–91.
195. Richards, supra note 193.
196. Id.
346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd  557 10/12/20  7:08 AM




   
   
  
   
   
    
   
     
       
   
   
  
   
   
   
   
 
   
  
   
   
   
  
     
 
   
      
      
 
          
   
       
      
       
        
       
       
   
   
   
         
2020] COMMENT 1545
resulted in a bigger push for single embryo transfer.197 Consequently, the
cryopreservation of embryos is a crucial component of providing assisted
reproduction that is both safe and affordable.198 
C. Theoretical Inconsistencies in the Louisiana Civil Code
The Louisiana Legislature chose to define pre-embryos not as natural
persons, which the Civil Code defines as human beings, but as juridical
persons.199 When analogizing embryos to plant seeds, Krentel argued that
it would be ludicrous if a “civilization of starving farmers . . . destroy[ed]
all seeds because they are not yet plants,” just as it would be ludicrous to
destroy “all embryos because they are not yet human beings.”200 Although
a pre-implantation embryo may be like a seed,201 the problem with
Krentel’s analogy is that the world’s population is not like a civilization of
starving farmers.202 Comparing frozen pre-implantation embryos to the
seeds of a starving civilization implies that the continued existence of
Louisiana’s population depends on assisted reproduction.203 
Furthermore, no one is advocating that all embryos be destroyed.204 
To say that embryos are destroyed simply because they are not yet human
beings is a gross oversimplification of IVF and ART procedures.205 As one
commentator notes, “the Louisiana Civil Code is more protective than the
French Civil Code, as it permits no interference with the embryos once a 
physician has fertilized a human ovum in vitro and grants the embryo full
recognition as a juridical person prior to implantation in the womb.”206 
Interestingly, however, Louisiana considers a human being that is born
dead to have never existed.207 Comment (d) to Civil Code article 26 states
197. Id.
198. Frydman, supra note 62, at 204–05.
199. LA. CIV. CODE art. 24 (2018). “According to the Romanist tradition,
persons are divided into natural persons and juridical persons. A natural person is
a human being. Only human beings may be natural persons.” LA. CIV. CODE art.
24 cmt. b (2018).
200. Krentel, supra note 39, at 287.
201. Krentel, supra note 39, at 287.
202. Contra Krentel, supra note 39, at 287.
203. See generally Krentel, supra note 39, at 287.
204. Contra Krentel, supra note 39, at 287.
205. Contra Krentel, supra note 39, at 287.
206. Jonathan F.X. O’Brien, Comment, Cinderella’s Dilemma: Does the In
Vitro Statute Fit? Cloning and Science in French and American Law, 6 TUL. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 526, 542 (1998).
207. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 25 cmt. b (2018).
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1546 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
that “[w]hen a child is born dead, the fiction of its personality from the
moment of conception is wiped out.”208 
As medical advancements in reproductive technology continue,
society as a whole must rethink concepts and assertions that once seemed
obvious.209 The Louisiana Legislature, for example, must question the 
Civil Code’s reference to the moment of a child’s conception.210 In 2017,
the International Committee for Monitoring Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, in partnership with ASRM and several additional ART
professional societies around the world,211 published a newly revised
version of “The International Glossary on Infertility and Fertility Care.”212 
Noted within the glossary was the decision to remove the term
“conception” altogether.213 The glossary states that the term “conception,”
as well as its derivatives, “are terms that cannot be described biologically
during the process of reproduction” and noted that a consensus was
reached that “efforts should be made to use scientifically recognized
definitions such as fertilization, implantation, pregnancy and live birth.”214 
If the term “conception” no longer corresponds to a biologically
recognizable stage, the Louisiana Legislature should consistently
acknowledge when rights attach to both in vitro and in vivo embryos.215 
Considering when rights attach to unborn children reveals another
theoretical inconsistency that Louisiana’s human embryo statutes create
within the Civil Code.216 This inconsistency involves the capacity of an
unborn child to receive donations, which is governed by article 1474.217 
208. Id. art. 26 cmt. d.
209. See generally Zegers-Hochschild, et al., supra note 43.
210. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 26; see also Zegers-Hochschild, et al.,
supra note 43.
211. In addition to the International Committee for Monitoring Assisted
Reproductive Technologies and the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine, participating professional societies included the European Society of
Human Reproduction and Embryology, International Federation of Fertility
Societies, March of Dimes, African Fertility Society, Groupe Inter-africain
d’Etude de Recherche et d’Application sur la Fertilité, Asian Pacific Initiative on
Reproduction, Middle East Fertility Society, Red Latinoamericana de 
Reproducción Asistida, and the International Federation of Gynecology and
Obstetrics. Zegers-Hochschild, et al., supra note 43.
212. Zegers-Hochschild, et al., supra note 43.
213. Zegers-Hochschild, et al., supra note 43, at 395.
214. Zegers-Hochschild, et al., supra note 43, at 395.
215. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 26 (2018). But see id. art. 1474; LA.
REV. STAT. §§ 9:123–24, 33 (2018).
216. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 1474.
217. Id. art. 1474.
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2020] COMMENT 1547
To have capacity to receive donations, article 1474 requires that an unborn
child be in utero.218 In addition, article 1474 states that all donations to an 
unborn child, whether inter vivos or mortis causa, only have effect “if the
child is born alive.”219 Given the in utero restriction, it makes little sense 
to classify pre-implantation embryos as juridical persons with their own
patrimonies. Moreover, embryo donation, like traditional adoption, does
not officially occur until the child is born.220 This birth requirement leaves
a theoretical gap in the parental rights of donated embryos.221 Louisiana
requires the donors of the egg and sperm who “renounce, by notarial act,
their parental rights for in utero implantation” to donate the pre-embryo 
for adoptive implantation, which inadvertently recognizes the existence of
embryo donors’ parental rights.222 Revised Statutes § 9:130, however,
states that constructive fulfillment for adoption in Louisiana “shall occur
when a married couple executes a notarial act of adoption” of a pre-
embryo and birth occurs.223 
From a policy perspective, Louisiana’s current statutory scheme does
not address the present realities that spring from the use of IVF and ART. 
Consequently, the Louisiana Legislature must consider a new approach–– 
a new categorization of the pre-implantation embryo. One consideration
that may aide legislators with necessary statutory revisions is the hierarchy
of interested parties.224 Stakeholders’ interests in pre-implantation
embryos vary markedly and help identify and weigh the rights in
question.225 In his article discussing the various parties and stakeholders
interested in the oversight of ART, Dr. David Adamson, former Chair of
the National Committee Overseeing ART, noted that the hierarchy of
interest model “suggests that patients, their gametic material, and future
children have the most interest in ART and its regulation, and their
interests should be paramount when developing regulation and
oversight.”226 Adhering to a hierarchy of interest model assures the best
218. Id. Specifically, article 1474 states that, “To be capable of receiving by
donation inter vivos, an unborn child must be in utero at the time the donation is
made. To be capable of receiving by donation mortis causa, an unborn child must
be in utero at the time of the death of the testator.” Id.
219. Id.
220. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:130.
221. See generally id.
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. David Adamson, Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technologies in
the United States, 39 FAM. L.Q. 727, 742–43 (2005).
225. Id.
226. Id.
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1548 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
outcome for the parties who matter most––ART patients and their future
children.227 
Dr. Adamson’s suggested hierarchy of interest identifies five main
categories of stakeholders.228 Second to actual ART patients and their
potential future children are the interests of physicians, embryologists, and
scientists.229 The third category of interests to be considered are those of
the ART professional societies, such as the ASRM, which develop
guidelines and issue advisory opinions for the best practice standards for
all involved in the ART process.230 The hierarchy’s fourth category of
interests are governmental regulatory agencies like the CDC, the Federal
Trade Commission, and the National Institutes of Health.231 The fifth and
final category includes society in general, as well as “other interested
stakeholders,” representing parties with the least interest in ART 
regulation.232 This type of hierarchical consideration laid out by Dr.
Adamson helps to clarify the desired objective of the law and provides a 
meaningful foundation on which lawmakers may base future amendments 
to Louisiana’s current statutory scheme.
Labels mold and constrain thoughts, and because the labels given to
embryos are determinative of legal status, the language used to define and
describe pre-embryos is of extreme importance.233 The word an individual
ascribes to a person, property, or obligation conditions that individual’s
thinking.
III. IN WITH THE NEW: EMBRYO CLASSIFICATION FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY
Adopting an approach that defines embryos as neither persons nor
property would alleviate some of the problems caused by their legal status
as juridical persons, thereby significantly improving Louisiana law. 
Instead of forcing pre-embryos to fit into a category of persons or property,
227. See generally id.
228. Id. at 743.
229. Id. Adamson states that physicians, embryologists, and scientists, as
stakeholders occupying the second-highest category of interest, represent the 
importance of “protection of the patient–physician relationship, confidentiality,
medico-legal protection, adequate compensation, minimal restrictions on
research, research funding and other professional interests that enhance high




233. See generally Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tenn. 1992)
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2020] COMMENT 1549
the Louisiana Legislature should adopt an approach that represents a true
middle ground, and it should do so by using the type of interim category
that the Davis court described.234 
A. Option One: “A Unique Category of Being”235 
Krentel based his statutory scheme around the idea that pre-
implantation embryos are “a unique category of being,” and the law should
treat them as such. This is not a blind assertion; rather, it is a recognition
of the progressive nature of human knowledge. Consequently, the best
solution is for the Louisiana Legislature to reclassify pre-implantation
embryos as a “unique category of being” and adjust the legal status of the
pre-embryos accordingly. Under this classification, the Louisiana
Legislature could categorize embryos in the same type of middle ground
category that states like Tennessee use.236 In fact, classification as a unique
category of being is substantially similar to the Tennessee Supreme
Court’s approach in Davis, which states that a pre-embryo is not a person
or property and, instead, that it occupies an “interim category” that is
entitled to special respect because of its potential for human life.237 More 
specifically, the new statutory language should read as follows: “Prior to
in utero implantation, pre-embryos created using assisted reproductive
technology shall be considered a unique category of being. As such, in the
absence of a more specific article or statute, pre-implantation embryos 
shall be governed by Book II of the Louisiana Civil Code.”238 
Broadly speaking, the Louisiana Civil Code classifies everything as
either “persons”239 or “things.”240 Logically, it follows that if a pre-embryo 
is not a person, then it must be a thing.241 Dr. Eric Reiter, a professor and
researcher focused on historical and comparative law concepts, has
analyzed problems associated with the binary nature of traditional civil
234. See generally id.
235. Krentel, supra note 39, at 287. This language comes from John B.
Krentel’s article, which was published in the Louisiana Bar Journal in 1985. In
his article, Krentel proposed the legal scheme that is now Louisiana Revised
Statutes §§ 9:121–33. See generally Krentel, supra note 39.
236. See generally Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588.
237. Id. at 597.
238. See generally LA. CIV. CODE Book II (2018) (titled “Things and the
Different Modifications of Ownership”).
239. See generally LA. CIV. CODE Book I (2018) (titled “Of Persons”).
240. See generally Book II, supra note 238. 
241. See generally id.
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1550 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
law taxonomy.242 Reiter explains the categorization of persons, things, and
obligations from three different perspectives: linear, circular, and
triangular.243 In his analysis, Reiter notes that legal classification is 
“largely driven by an understanding of the boundaries between categories
as clear lines necessitating either/or choices.”244 This traditional binary 
view does not allow any overlap.245 If something is an obligation, it is 
neither a thing nor a person.246 If something is a person, it is categorically
incapable of being an obligation or a thing.247 The linear view can be
visualized as three boxes—persons, things, and obligations—organized in
a straight line, which allows persons to interact with things and things to
interface with obligations.248 Although similar to the linear view, a circular
visualization of the three categories creates an additional interaction
between persons and obligations.249 The problem with linear and circular
models is that they ignore the “interrelations between all three
categories.”250 Rather than analyzing legal classifications from a linear or
circular perspective, Reiter proposes a triangular model in which
“classification takes place within the area enclosed by the triangle.”251 
Under Reiter’s triangular model, persons, things, and obligations each
occupy one of the triangle’s corners, and the center represents the balanced
mixture of the categories.252 Applying Reiter’s model to the 
reclassification of embryos, one could assume that pre-embryos, as a
unique category of being, fall somewhere near the center of the triangle.253 
Prior to in vitro fertilization, a human ovum may shift away from the
center of the triangle, closer to the corner specifically dedicated to
things.254 After fertilization and successful implantation into a woman’s
uterus, an embryo may shift closer to the classification of persons.255 The
242. See generally Eric H. Reiter, Rethinking Civil-Law Taxonomy: Persons,
Things, and the Problem of Domat’s Monster, 1 J. CIV. L. STUD. 189 (2008).
243. Id. at 199–201.
244. Id. at 199.
245. See generally id.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. Id. at 199–200.
249. Id. at 200.
250. See id. at 201.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See generally id. at 198–203.
254. See generally id.
255. See generally id.
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2020] COMMENT 1551
advantage of Reiter’s triangular model lies in its ability to adapt to change
without forcing preclusion.256 
As a unique category of being, pre-implantation embryos should be
governed by Book II of the Civil Code, “Things and the Different
Modifications of Ownership,”257 rather than Book I, “Of Persons.”258 The 
Louisiana Legislature could treat pre-implantation embryos as “incidents
of human personality” that are not “susceptible of appropriation.”259 
Treating pre-embryos as incidents of human personality would respect the
potential for human life held by pre-embryos while also acknowledging
that the primary rights in need of protection are those of the gamete
providers. As A.N. Yiannopoulos explained, incidents of human
personality refer to things like a person’s name, likeness, and liberty,
which “are not objects of property, but are incidents of a comprehensive
‘right of personality’ that is accorded an almost absolute protection
without regard to rules of property law.”260 Categorizing pre-implantation 
embryos as a unique category of being would distinguish them from
property while also removing their legal capacity as juridical persons. The
classification of pre-embryos as unique category of being would be a better
fit because “[a] living human body and its members or parts are generally
regarded as incidents of one’s own personality, and, therefore, not as
objects of property rights.”261 This approach would more closely align pre-
embryos with unborn children, which is particularly fitting because both
have the potential for human life that is not yet realized. 
As a unique category of being, a pre-implantation embryo would no
longer have legal capacity as a juridical person to sue or be sued.262 
Although the unique being classification distinguishes pre-embryos from
mere property, the analysis regarding capacity to sue remains the same
under either approach, as both terminate the embryo’s legal status as a
juridical person. Applied to the dispute between Loeb and Vergara, both
options would foreclose the possibility that a Louisiana court may have
jurisdiction over the suit.263 Because pre-implantation embryos would no
longer be considered persons or have the capacity to sue, there would no
256. See id. at 201–03.
257. See generally Book II, supra note 238.
258. See generally Book I, supra note 239.
259. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 156, at 35.
260. Id. at 35–36.
261. Id. at 36.
262. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:124 (2018).
263. See generally Human Embryo #4 HB-A v. Vergara, No. 17-1498, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136782 (E.D. La. Aug. 25, 2017).
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longer be an issue over custody of the embryos, and the court could 
dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction over Vergara.264 
Additionally, the Louisiana Legislature should take proactive steps to
safeguard the best interests of pre-implantation embryos. Although
Louisiana’s current statutory scheme purports to protect the best interest
of embryos, it exists only as a reaction to embryos that individuals have 
already created.265 Protecting the best interests of embryos would be better
achieved through a proactive approach.266 Switzerland, for example, uses
a proactive approach, and its legislation focuses heavily on the potential
psychological risks associated with ART, requiring that all users “be fully
informed of all the medical, psychological, physical, juridical, . . . and
financial aspects.”267 In Switzerland, individuals hoping to use ART must
first receive counseling and “observe a four week period of reflection.”268 
If procedures are unsuccessful for three cycles, Switzerland requires
individuals to reaffirm their consent and observe another four-week period 
of reflection.269 By using this framework, Switzerland seeks to ensure that
individuals using ART “have no doubt of their desire to create a baby via
medical assistance and will be less likely to have conflicting emotions at
a later date.”270 Instead of focusing on laws that react to embryo disputes, 
this type of proactive approach would more effectively safeguard the best
interests of pre-implantation embryos. 
B. Option Two: Unique and Irreplaceable Property
Alternatively, the Louisiana Legislature could define pre-embryos as
“unique and irreplaceable property.” One immediate problem with this 
approach is the link between property and ownership. The definition of
ownership in the Civil Code, however, does not allow individuals to do
anything they want with the property they own.271 Article 477 states that
an owner may “use, enjoy, and dispose of [the thing owned] within the
limits and under the conditions established by law.”272 The limiting
264. See Human Embryo, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136782, at *18–20.
265. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:131.
266. See generally Sandi Varnado, Comment, Who's Your Daddy?: A
Legitimate Question Given Louisiana's Lack of Legislation Governing Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 66 LA. L. REV. 609, 650–53 (2006).
267. Id. at 651–52.
268. Id. at 652.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 477(A) (2018).
272. Id. (emphasis added).
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2020] COMMENT 1553
language in article 477 already provides an avenue for the legislature to
restrict the property rights an individual or couple may have in pre-
embryos.273 With the restrictions of article 477 in mind, the Louisiana
Legislature could adopt a property approach classifying pre-implantation
embryos as “unique and irreplaceable property.”274 
Under this approach, the word “irreplaceable” refers to the
combination of genetic material specific to whichever embryo that
happens to be in dispute. “Unique” seeks to separate pre-embryos from
other property that individuals consider irreplaceable. Together, the words
“unique” and “irreplaceable” acknowledge the care that courts should use
when resolving property disputes over pre-implantation embryos. The
words “unique” and “irreplaceable” do not, however, change the embryos’
legal status from that of mere property. Instead, the words provide a
surface-level distinction, allowing flexibility for all parties by not
precluding or endorsing any specific group, religion, or moral philosophy.
Instead, individuals may treat their embryos as property, persons, or
something in between, and they may act according to that belief.
The meaning of this language is similar to the language that a Missouri
appellate court used in the 2016 case McQueen v. Gadberry.275 In
McQueen, the court classified pre-implantation embryos as “marital
property of a special character.”276 The McQueen court stated that
Missouri courts have previously only considered unborn children to mean
every stage of biological development in utero.277 The McQueen court also 
looked to the definition of property, “defined in relevant part as ‘[a]ny
external thing over which the rights of . . . use . . . are exercised[.]’”278 
Because pre-implantation embryos are “outside of [the woman’s] uterus
and cryogenically preserved and stored in an artificial environment,” the
frozen embryos would be considered external things, thereby falling under
the stated definition of property.279 
By referring to pre-implantation embryos as irreplaceable property
instead of marital property, the proposed language attempts to be more
inclusive and indicates acceptance of all individuals undergoing fertility
treatment regardless of their relationship statuses.280 Specifically using the
word “irreplaceable” would classify pre-implantation embryos as non-
273. Id.
274. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 477.
275. See McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
276. See id.
277. Id. at 141.
278. Id. at 148–49 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (7th ed. 1999)).
279. Id. 
280. See generally id.
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fungibles.281 Additionally, the words “unique” and “irreplaceable”
distinguish pre-embryos from other forms of property. The McQueen court
noted that pre-embryos “are unlike traditional forms of property or
external things” for several reasons.282 Pre-embryos, for example, “are 
comprised of a woman and man’s genetic material, are human tissue,” and 
have the potential for human life.283 
One of the main problems with categorizing pre-implantation embryos
as property is that the Louisiana Civil Code does not provide a specific
definition of property. Consequently, property is defined by its common
usage.284 As noted by renowned civilian scholar A.N. Yiannopoulos, 
“Property is a word with high emotional overtones and so many meanings
that it has defied attempts at accurate all-inclusive definition.”285 Under its 
common usage, “property” is widely understood to refer to something that
a person may own.286 In the Civil Code, however, “property” also refers to
the rights that a person possesses, including obligations and real rights.287 
According to Yiannopoulos, property law does not govern legal relations
“of a predominantly moral character,” like marriage and filiation. 288 This, 
Yiannopoulos says, is because legal relations receive “adequate
protection” elsewhere in the law.289 
Another problem with this solution is that, much like classifying an
embryo as a juridical person, the categorization of the pre-implantation
embryo as property would also force embryos into a legal scheme that
legislation and jurisprudence extensively define.290 In addition, any
281. “Fungibles are things that, according to law or the intention of the parties,
are interchangeable; non-fungibles are things that are not interchangeable.” 
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 156, at 55.
282. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 148–49.
283. Id.
284. Article 11 of the Louisiana Civil Code states that “words of a law must
be given their generally prevailing meaning. Words of art and technical terms
must be given their technical meaning when the law involves a technical matter.”
LA. CIV. CODE art. 11 (2018).
285. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 156, at 1.
286. See Property, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/ [https://perma.cc/8N3C-KT3J] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
287. “In the Louisiana Civil Code the word property is at times a translation
of the French propriété and at times a translation of biens. In context, it may mean
things, ownership, or patrimony.” YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 156, at 4.
288. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 156, at 38.
289. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 156, at 38.
290. See generally DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETT, JEANNE LOUISE CARRIERE, &
JOHN RANDALL TRAHAN, YIANNOPOULOS’ CIVIL LAW PROPERTY COURSEBOOK
(10th ed. 2014).
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2020] COMMENT 1555
attempt to classify embryos as property in Louisiana is unlikely to succeed
politically, which the legislature’s recent codification of law surrounding
surrogacy contracts shows.291 In 2016, the Louisiana Legislature enacted 
legislation to regulate gestational carrier contracts, which former
Governor Bobby Jindal vetoed twice.292 The Louisiana Legislature later
passed the surrogacy legislation293 after Jindal left office.294 As one 
commentator has noted, “Aside from the exploitation and
commercialization concerns addressed in Governor Jindal’s veto message
[of Senate Bill 162], various religious organizations295 played a major role
in the Governor’s decision to not pass the Bill.”296 In the surrogacy
legislation, the legislature stated its desire to ensure that all children born
using ART be both legally and biologically related to the intended
parents.297 Given Louisiana’s political landscape, categorizing pre-
implantation embryos as “a unique category of being” is likely a less
controversial option than the “unique and irreplaceable property”
classification, as well as a step in the right direction.
CONCLUSION
Louisiana’s long-standing human embryo statutes, written more than
35 years ago, are out of date and in need of revision. Louisiana’s current 
human embryo statutes do not sufficiently address the present-day realities
of the ever-changing world of medical technology. Defining pre-
implantation embryos as juridical persons ignores the purpose of assisted
reproductive technology and the wide-ranging realities of the individuals
291. See generally LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:2718–2720.5 (2018).
292. Letter from Bobby Jindal, Governor, Louisiana, to Glenn Koepp,
Secretary of the Senate, Louisiana (June 20, 2013); Letter from Bobby Jindal,
Governor, Louisiana, to Alfred Speer, Clerk of the House of Representatives, 
Louisiana (May 30, 2014). Groups that opposed Senate Bill 162, which dealt with
gestational surrogacy agreements and was proposed in the 2013 regular session,
included Equality Louisiana, the Louisiana Family Forum, the Louisiana 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, the National Organization for Women, and the
Center for Bioethics and Culture. Brett, supra note 70, at 616–20.
293. See generally LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:2718–2720.5.
294. Id.
295. One of the religious organizations that opposed the bill, the Louisiana
Conference of Catholic Bishops, stated that gestational surrogacy violated human
dignity, threatened life, and altered the “sacred unit of family” by introducing a
third party into the marriage dynamic. Brett, supra note 70, at 622–23.
296. Brett, supra note 70, at 622.
297. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2718.
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who use it. IVF is now 40-year-old technology,298 and the Louisiana
Legislature must acknowledge the reality of the way it is used. The
language of the current statutory scheme forces pre-implantation embryos
into entirely unrelated legal schemes and contexts that are already well-
defined and specifically tailored around other issues. The Louisiana
Legislature, in its revision, should enact legislation that pursues a middle
ground approach in the categorization of pre-implantation embryos. Pre-
implantation embryos should not retain the legal status of juridical persons
or the capacity to sue. The Louisiana Legislature should change the laws
defining human embryos as juridical persons299 and instead classify them
as “a unique category of being.”300 
298. Gianpiero D. Palermo et al., The Story of ICSI, 110 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 185, 195 (2018).
299. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:123.
300. See generally Krentel, supra note 39.
